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How does heightened uncertainty affect the costs of raising finance through the
bond market and through bank loans? Empirically, I find that a rise in uncertainty is
accompanied by an increase in corporate bond yields and a decrease in bank lending
rates. This new stylized fact can be explained in a model with costly state verification
and a special informational role for banks. In contrast to bond investors, banks acquire
additional costly information about borrowers in times of uncertainty in order to reduce
uncertainty. Having this information, the lending relationship becomes more valuable
to the bank, resulting in a lower lending rate so that the relationship is not put at risk.
The cost of bond finance increases because bond investors demand to be compensated
for the increased risk of firm default. These findings suggest that the adverse effects
of uncertainty are mitigated for firms that rely on bank finance as long as banks are
highly capitalized.
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1 Introduction
Is the cost of bank finance different from that of bond finance in times of elevated uncertainty?
In contrast to bond holders, banks often form long-term relationships with their borrowers.
Maintaining these relationships induces banks to lend at more favorable terms in response
to changes in a firm’s credit risk (see, e.g., Berlin and Mester, 1999; Petersen and Rajan,
1995). Sharpe (1991) argues that banks may continue to lend to troubled borrowers even
at concessionary rates. Therefore, the costs of bond finance and bank loans may evolve
differently during periods of heightened uncertainty.
This paper makes two contributions. First, using uncertainty proxies calculated from
survey data, I document a new stylized fact for the United States and Germany: following a
sudden hike in uncertainty, the cost of corporate bond finance increases, whereas bank loan
rates decrease. Second, using a simple partial equilibrium model, I explore the reasons for
these opposite reactions of bond finance and bank loans. The model features costly state
verification and a special informational role for banks. In contrast to bond holders, banks
maintain long-term relationships with their clients and are able to acquire costly information
about borrowers. When uncertainty increases, banks collect additional information which
reduces uncertainty and the expected borrower default. In addition, this information makes the
relationship even more valuable by strengthening the banks’ information monopoly over the
borrower in the future. Banks reduce lending rates so that the relationship is not jeopardized.
A recent strand of the literature argues that uncertainty affects the real economy through
financial frictions. Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek (2014) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno
(2014) suggest that higher uncertainty about idiosyncratic productivity increases the probabil-
ity of firm default. Due to limited liability, the risk premium on the cost of external financing
rises (risk compensation channel).1 Gilchrist et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence for this
channel for the United States using spreads derived from corporate bond yields.2 However,
many firms, particularly in the Euro Area, rely more heavily on banks for debt financing than
on the capital market.3
1The interaction between uncertainty and different types of financial frictions is also theoretically analyzed
by Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2016), Bonciani and van Roye (2016), Cesa-Bianchi and Fernandez-Corugedo
(2014), Chugh (2016), Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2008), Fendoglu (2014), Fernández-Villaverde (2010),
Güntner (2015), and Hafstead and Smith (2012).
2For the United States, Popp and Zhang (2016) confirm that a rise in uncertainty widens the corporate
bond spread. In addition, Caldara, Fuentes-Albero, Gilchrist, and Zakrajšek (2016) show that increases in
uncertainty deteriorate financial conditions as measured by the excess bond premium. For Germany, Popescu
and Smets (2010) demonstrate that higher uncertainty raises the common component of several risk premium
indices.
3Figure 1 presents the shares of total debt of nonfinancial corporations for a number of European countries
and the United States in 2015. For Spain, Germany, and Italy, corporate bonds account for 2–13% of their
total debt, for France and the United Kingdom, this figure is 22–26%, whereas for the United States it is 71%.
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The novel contribution of this paper is to analyze the effects of uncertainty on corporate
bond yields and bank loan rates for the United States and Germany. To construct idiosyncratic
uncertainty measures, I follow the strategy of Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims (2013) and use
survey data from the Philadelphia Fed’s Business Outlook Survey (BOS) for the United States
and from the IFO Business Climate Survey (IFO-BCS) for Germany. This is in contrast
to Gilchrist et al. (2014), who rely on U.S. financial data.4 The drawback of financial data
is that they limit the analysis to large firms, whereas survey data encompass firms of all
sizes–at least in the IFO-BCS. Furthermore, survey data capture actual decision-makers at
the firms in contrast to, for example, financial analysts (Bachmann et al., 2013). From the
survey data, I calculate the cross-sectional dispersion of expectations about future economic
activity for each country and use it as a proxy for idiosyncratic uncertainty. Using vector
autoregression models, a sudden rise in uncertainty leads to an increase in corporate bond
yields, whereas bank loan rates fall. This contrasting behavior is found for both the United
States and Germany. A number of robustness checks confirm this result.
Why do the costs of bank finance decrease in periods of heightened uncertainty while
those of bond finance increase? To answer this question, I develop a partial equilibrium
model that features costly state verification (CSV) and a special informational role for banks.
Firms finance their projects by obtaining bank loans or issuing bonds. There are two types of
informational problems: (i) information is asymmetrically distributed between borrowers and
lenders, and (ii) the outcome of a firm’s project is ex-ante uncertain to both the borrower and
the lender. Uncertainty about the project stems both from risk and ambiguity (Knightian
uncertainty) (Rossi, Sekhposyan, and Soupre, 2016). An increase in risk raises the dispersion
of the distribution. Higher ambiguity makes it harder to correctly assign probabilities to each
possible event.
In contrast to bond investors, banks are able to at least partially overcome both types of
informational problems. First, through continuous interactions with the customers, banks
acquire private information and reduce informational asymmetries over time (see, e.g.,
Boot, 2000). Banks obtain an informational advantage over other, uninformed lenders, and
they can charge a markup on the loan rate in later periods due to monopoly power (see,
e.g., Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia, 1989; Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990). This is the
In contrast, bank loans amount to 29% of firm debt in the United States and 74–98% in the five European
countries.
4To derive a measure for idiosyncratic uncertainty, Gilchrist et al. (2014) use daily stock returns for U.S.
nonfinancial corporations. In a first step, they remove the forecastable variation in idiosyncratic excess returns.
In a second step, they compute the quarterly firm-level standard deviation of the estimated residuals from the
first step. In a third step, they assume that this standard deviation follows an AR(1) process with firm fixed
effects, a firm-specific term and time fixed effects. The series of time fixed effects is used as an aggregate
proxy for idiosyncratic uncertainty.
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long-term-benefit of collecting private information. Second, banks can spend resources to
collect additional market information in order to reduce the ambiguous component of the
project’s return distribution and share this information with their borrower.5 This is the
short-term benefit of acquiring market information. This additional market information
encompasses more than what is publicly available, and can include, for example, information
about the market in which the firm operates gleaned from talking to other customers active
in the same sector or by having the bank’s economic department conduct in-depth market
analyses. Market information does not affect the risky component of the return distribution,
however. As with private information, market information facilitates the lender’s continuation
or liquidation of the project in the event of borrower default. A future default becomes less
costly and banks can charge higher loan rates in later periods. This is the long-term-benefit
of collecting market information.
Banks can counteract an increase in uncertainty by collecting additional costly market
information that (i) reduces the ambiguous component and dampens the increase in uncertainty.
Subsequently, the increase in the expected probability of borrower default and in the lending
rate is attenuated. As a side effect, additional market information (ii) increases the value
of the customer-bank relationship via higher future markups due to lower costs of borrower
default. The bank’s incentive to prevent the borrower from defaulting during the period of
elevated uncertainty becomes stronger, and thus the bank lowers the lending rate during this
time. Put together, the two effects constitute the information channel of uncertainty. This
channel puts downward pressure on the lending rate in times of heightened uncertainty.
The bank loan rate is determined by both the risk compensation and the information
channel. If the sum of the short-term advantage of lower uncertainty and the long-term
benefit of continuing the relationship are larger than the short-term gain of being adequately
compensated for the increased risk, banks lower the lending rate. In contrast, bond investors
have only publicly available information and are not specialized in collecting private or
additional market information (see, e.g. Rajan, 1992). When uncertainty rises, the cost of
corporate bonds is determined only by the risk compensation channel, and market debt
becomes more expensive.
A different explanation for why average bank lending rates fall could have to do with
compositional changes among borrowers (see, e.g., Gilchrist and Mojon, forthcoming).
Following a rise in uncertainty, banks may prefer to lend less to risky borrowers and increase
the amount of loans to firms with relatively safe projects. The cost of relatively safe loans
should remain unaffected by higher uncertainty. Risky loans, if they are even granted, are
5In the same spirit, De Fiore and Uhlig (2011) argue that banks can acquire additional information about
an economy-wide uncertain productivity factor and adjust the loan contract accordingly, which reduces the
riskiness of bank finance for a firm compared to bond finance.
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offered at higher rates to compensate the lender. A higher fraction of safe loans and a lower
fraction of risky loans could yield a lower average lending rate. To analyze this channel,
one of the empirical robustness checks looks at loan rates for different risk categories. In
response to a rise in uncertainty, the lending rate always falls, regardless of the riskiness
of the borrower. Even relatively high-risk borrowers are charged lower lending rates when
uncertainty increases. While banks may still change the composition of their portfolios in
periods of elevated uncertainty, risk shifting cannot explain why lending rates fall for all risk
types.6
This paper is the first to analyze the link between (idiosyncratic) uncertainty and the
costs of bank loans. There are several contributions in the literature that look at the effects
of (aggregate) uncertainty on the supply of bank loans (Alessandri and Bottero, 2017; Bordo,
Duca, and Koch, 2016; Buch, Buchholz, and Tonzer, 2015; Raunig, Scharler, and Sindermann,
forthcoming; Valencia, 2013). They find that increases in uncertainty have a negative effect
on bank lending. However, they also document that the negative relationship is mostly
driven by banks that are less capitalized or have low liquidity buffers. These results do not
necessarily contradict the findings of this paper. Poorly capitalized banks reduce lending when
uncertainty increases. They are not concerned with long-term motives and do not maintain
relationship lending. In contrast, highly capitalized banks acquire additional information
when uncertainty rises, the value of relationship lending rises, and they continue to lend
both to safer and riskier borrowers at lower rates. Due to the capital buffer, these banks
can continue to lend to borrowers with relatively uncertain prospects without raising the
probability of bank default.
Section 2 presents the construction of the idiosyncratic uncertainty proxies and describes
the measures for the costs of external finance. Section 3 empirically investigates the effects of
uncertainty shocks on corporate bond yields and bank loan rates; robustness tests are also
presented. Section 4 provides context for the empirical results using a partial equilibrium
model. Section 5 concludes.
6Another possible explanation for why lending rates do not increase in times of elevated risk involves
problems of adverse selection or moral hazard. Banks may be reluctant to raise interest rates because this
may shift the composition of their loan portfolio towards borrowers with riskier projects (adverse selection) or
because they fear that borrowers will switch to riskier projects (moral hazard). Appendix C takes an analytical
look at these two arguments, and finds that banks raise loan rates regardless of whether risk increases for all
types of borrowers or for all types of projects. Therefore, the presence of adverse selection or moral hazard
cannot explain why lending rates fall when risk increases.
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2 Measuring Uncertainty and the Costs of External
Finance
This section presents the construction of the idiosyncratic uncertainty proxies and describes
the series that reflect the costs of external finance.
I follow Bachmann et al. (2013) in constructing the idiosyncratic uncertainty proxies for
the United States and Germany. For the United States, I use data from the BOS, which
is conducted monthly by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The uncertainty proxy
FDISPUS is the dispersion of firms’ forecasts about the general business outlook.7 For
Germany, I rely on manufacturing firms’ responses to the IFO-BCS, which is conducted on
a monthly basis. The uncertainty proxy FDISPGER is calculated as the cross-sectional
dispersion of expectations about future production. Bachmann et al. (2013) show that both
uncertainty measures are countercyclical and positively correlated with other uncertainty
proxies.
For the United States, I take the loan rate of commercial and industrial loans with an
initial interest rate fixation of up to one year.8 This series is part of the Survey of Terms
of Business Lending (STBL) and is collected quarterly from a random sample of about 300
U.S. banks (Brady, English, and Nelson, 1998). Due to the lower frequency, I interpolate the
series with the monthly available prime rate as an interpolator variable using the Chow-Lin
procedure.9 Loans with a maturity of up to one year cover about 94% of all commercial and
industrial loans. For Germany, I use the loan rate of new loans to nonfinancial corporations
in Germany with an initial interest rate fixation of up to one year. This series is part of the
MFI interest rate statistics and is collected monthly by the Deutsche Bundesbank from a
representative sample of 200–240 banks in Germany. The reported interest rates are weighted
with the respective volume of new business loans, which are also reported by the banks, to
derive an average interest rate. Loans with a maturity of one year cover around 82% of all
new loans to nonfinancial corporations. In 2003, the national interest rate statistics of all
countries in the Eurozone were harmonized. Differences in the methodology of interest rate
7A more detailed description of the proxies is presented in Appendix A.
8The rate is constructed as the volume-weighted average of the rates of loans with a repricing interval of
zero, daily, 2 to 30 days, and 31 to 365 days. The volume weighted average maturity of these loans is 474 days
for the period 2003:Q1–2016:Q2, which is a bit longer than a year. Therefore, I associate bank loans with a
maturity of one year and use the expressions “repricing interval” and “maturity” interchangeably throughout
the paper.
9The prime rate is the rate charged by the majority of the largest 25 U.S. commercial banks on many of
their (short-term) commercial loans and is an indicator for many other loan rates. At a quarterly frequency,
the prime rate and the loan rate from the STBL are highly correlated; the correlation coefficient is 0.99.
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statistics before and after 2003 makes it difficult to compare the loan rates (see Deutsche
Bundesbank, 2004); therefore, this paper only looks at the period since 2003.
For the United States, I use the corporate bond yield for maturities between one and three
years. The yield tracks the performance of outstanding bonds issued by investment-grade
U.S. corporations. For Germany, I rely on yields from outstanding bonds issued by German
nonfinancial corporations. These include securities with a maturity of more than four years,
the yields of the individual securities are weighted by the amounts outstanding at market
prices. The average maturity of these bonds is six years in the period 2003-2015.10 To my
knowledge, other indexes are not available because of the relatively small market for German
corporate bonds.
Figure 2 plots the time series of the uncertainty proxies, bond yields, and bank lending
rates for the United States and Germany. For illustrative purposes, the monthly series are
averaged to a quarterly frequency. The uncertainty measures are demeaned and normalized
by their standard deviation. The upper two panels show the uncertainty proxies and the
corporate bond yields for the United States and Germany for the time period 2003:Q1–
2016:Q2. In both countries, uncertainty and the corporate bond yield co-move; for the United
States, the correlation coefficient is 0.54, for Germany it is 0.16. The lower two panels plot
the uncertainty proxies and the bank loan rates for the United States and Germany. The
co-movement between uncertainty and the bank loan rate is less pronounced in the United
States; the correlation coefficient is 0.30. In Germany, the two series are negatively correlated
with a coefficient of –0.39.
3 Empirical Evidence
In this section, I use standard vector autoregressions (VARs) to analyze how capital markets
and banks respond to surprise increases in uncertainty. I am particularly interested in the
responses of corporate bond yields and bank loan rates. I employ data from both the United
States and Germany.
3.1 Baseline Results
Two VARs are estimated for each country. The baseline VARs consist of three variables:
a proxy for uncertainty, a measure for the cost of external finance, and the government
bond yield as a measure for the riskless rate. The cost of external finance is either the
10I thank Anja Huck from the Deutsche Bundesbank for providing me with this information.
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yield on corporate bonds or the bank loan rate.11 As the riskless rate I use the one-year
government bond yield of the respective country, with the exception of the model with the
German corporate bond yield, which includes the German government bond yield with a
six-year maturity.12 The sample period is from 2003:M1 to 2016:M6. The VARs are at
a monthly frequency and estimated with a constant. The lag length is set to three in all
models.13 Uncertainty is ordered before the interest rate variables in a recursive identification.
Innovations in uncertainty, therefore, have an immediate impact on the interest rate variables.
Following the argument of Leduc and Liu (2016), this ordering can be justified by the fact
that survey respondents in the IFO-BCS (BOS) answer by the middle of month t (by the
first week of month t). Therefore, they do not have complete information about interest rates
in month t and the information set contains only realizations of interest rates up to month
t−1. A similar ordering is found in Gilchrist et al. (2014). In the following, I consider unit
shocks to the standardized uncertainty series to ensure that possible differences in the impulse
responses between the United States and Germany can be traced back to differences in the
transmission mechanism and not to differences in the shock size.
Figure 3 plots the impulse responses from the four separate VARs for the United States
and Germany after an innovation to FDISPUS and FDISPGER, respectively. The results
for the United States are shown in the first and third rows; the second and fourth rows cover
the responses for Germany. The responses in the first two rows are based on the models
with corporate bond yields. The impulse responses of the spread variables are calculated as
the difference between each of the responses of the cost of external finance and the riskless
rate. In both countries, the corporate bond yields and government bond yields move in
opposite directions. The government bond yields decrease, with a minimum after about a year,
signaling an increase in demand for government bonds consistent with a flight to safety. In
contrast, the corporate bond yields increase. In the United States, the cost of corporate bond
finance reaches a peak of about 20 basis points after four months; in Germany the maximum
amounts to around 10 basis points after three months. The yield reverts back more slowly in
the United States than it does in Germany. The spread between the corporate bond yield
and the riskless rate rises in both countries. The spreads increase by roughly 10 basis points
on impact, respectively, and reach a maximum of around 20 basis points after five months in
11For the United States, the yield on corporate bonds includes bonds with a maturity between one and three
years. I rely on this type of maturity so as to be as close as possible to the maturity of bank loans. Alternatively,
I use the 30-year Baa-rated corporate bond yield index, a commonly used index in the uncertainty literature
(see, e.g., Bachmann et al., 2013), along with the corresponding 30-year government bond yield, which yields
similar results.
12For the United States, the model with corporate bond yields and the U.S. government bond yield with a
three-year maturity yields quantitatively similar results.
13The BIC criterion suggests between one and two lags for the different models, the AIC criterion between
two and 10 lags. Therefore, a lag length of three falls in the middle of these suggested values.
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the United States and after 3 months in Germany. The following decreases are more gradual
in the United States than in Germany.
The responses based on the models with bank loan rates are shown in the last two rows
of Figure 3. In both countries, the bank loan rates and government bond yields move in
the same direction. In the United States, the loan rate reaches its minimum of –10 basis
points after four months and returns to equilibrium relatively quickly. Loan rates in Germany
fall for one and a half years and revert back slowly. The minimum amounts to roughly –30
basis points. The spread between the bank loan rate and the riskless rate does not change
significantly in the United States. In Germany, the loan spread increases but not as much
as the bond spread. The maximum increase is less than 10 basis points and occurs after 3
months. The return to equilibrium is gradual.
The results from the baseline VARs show that an unexpected increase in uncertainty leads
to an increase in corporate bond yields and a decline in bank lending rates. The costs of
bank and bond finance diverge in times of heightened uncertainty. A potential explanation
for this finding is that bond investors want to be compensated for the higher borrower
default risk and demand higher risk premia. In contrast, banks are specialized in resolving
informational problems. When uncertainty increases, banks acquire additional information
about the borrower in order to reduce uncertainty. This has two effects. First, lowering
uncertainty about a project’s return dampens the increase in the expected borrower default,
which attenuates the increase in the lending rate. Second, having more information about
the borrower’s environment strengthens the bank’s information monopoly and it can charge
higher markups. This increases the bank’s incentive to maintain its relationship with the
customer by lowering the lending rate during periods of heightened uncertainty.
3.2 Robustness
The results from the baseline models reveal that loan rates fall and corporate bond yields rise
after changes in uncertainty. I now conduct a battery of tests to check the robustness of the
baseline results.
Bank loan rates are influenced by a changing composition of borrowers. Following a rise
in uncertainty, banks may prefer to lend less to risky borrowers and increase the amount of
loans to firms with relatively safe projects. Therefore, lower average lending rates in periods
of uncertainty could simply be due to a change in the composition of the banks’ loan portfolio.
Note that uncertainty should hardly affect the cost of relatively safe loans. Risky loans,
if they are even granted, should be offered at higher rates to compensate the lender. The
STBL data allow calculating loan rates separately for different borrower types. In the survey,
banks report risk ratings for their loans. Loans are classified as having either minimal, low,
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moderate, or acceptable risk.14 If portfolio composition was the principal explanation for
falling average rates, one would expect the rate on loans in the acceptable-risk category to
increase during periods of heightened uncertainty, while the rate on relatively safe loans
should remain broadly unchanged. Figure 4 plots the impulse responses of the rates on loans
from each of the four risk categories to the same uncertainty shock. In response to a surprise
increase in uncertainty, the rates on loans in all four risk categories fall. Quantitatively, the
decrease is very similar. Therefore, in periods of elevated uncertainty, loan rates do not vary
conditional on the riskiness of the borrowers. Even relatively risky borrowers are charged
lower lending rates when uncertainty increases. As this exercise only looks at rates, not loan
volumes, uncertainty may still induce banks to shift their portfolio toward safer loans, but
this does not explain why loan rates fall for all risk types.
A differentiation of loan rates with respect to risk category is not available for Germany.
As a proxy, I separately estimate the VAR with rates on loans below a volume of 1 Mio Euro
and above 1 Mio Euro. As before, I look at loans with an initial interest rate fixation of up
to one year. For the period 2003:M1 to 2016:M6, the average rates for the two categories
are 4.1% and 3.0%, respectively, which may be an indication that smaller loans are riskier
than bigger loans. Results are depicted in Panel (a) of Figure 5. Qualitatively, there are no
differences between the responses of the two rates after an uncertainty shock. Quantitatively,
the decrease in the rate for smaller loans is a bit more pronounced compared to the fall in the
cost of larger loans. Therefore, risk shifting may not explain the decrease in the overall loan
rate in Germany either.
The next robustness check tackles the issue of compositional changes from a different
direction. During the financial crisis of 2007–2009, Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2013) find that
bank lending declined and firms shifted toward the capital market for financing, at a time
when corporate bond yields increased more than bank loan rates (De Fiore and Uhlig, 2015).
In their model, De Fiore and Uhlig (2015) argue that the cost of market finance rises because
the average default risk of the pool of bond-financed firms increases. Even though firms with
a high risk of default stop borrowing from banks, the cost of bank finance increases, albeit to
a smaller extent than bond yields. This is because firms with intermediate risk switch from
bank to bond finance. To analyze whether there are dynamic effects between the costs of
bond and bank finance, I include both the loan rate and the corporate bond yield in the VAR.
The results are shown in Panel (b) of Figure 5.15 In both countries the impulse responses are
14Brady et al. (1998) provide precise definitions for the risk classifications.
15As the corporate bond yield and the loan rate in Germany have different maturities, the German VAR
includes two riskless rates (government bond yields with a maturity of one year and of six years). The VAR
for the United States includes only the one-year government bond yield because both the cost of market debt
and bank loans have roughly the same maturity.
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similar to the baseline results. The costs of bond finance increase and bank finance becomes
cheaper. However, there are some interactions between the two variables. In the United
States, the increase in corporate bond yields is not as persistent and lending rates fall to a
smaller extent compared to the baseline responses. Similarly, German bank loan rates do
not decrease as much. However, the increase in the German bond yield is larger than in the
baseline. In sum, there are some dynamic effects between the costs of bond and bank finance.
However, the interaction is not large enough to change the finding of higher bond yields and
lower lending rates during periods of elevated uncertainty.
Building on the previous robustness check, I extend the VARs to include loan and corporate
bond volumes. This is done to check whether (i) the increase in the cost of bond finance is
due to an increase in bond issues and (ii) the reduction in the bank loan rate is explained by a
fall in the volume of new loans. The former could be interpreted as an increase in the supply
of bonds, the latter as a reduction in loan demand. I use Bayesian estimation techniques in
this robustness test because of the relatively large number of variables compared to the short
sample period. The model for the United States is estimated at a quarterly frequency because
data on the volumes of loans and corporate bonds are available only at this frequency.16
The models include additional information in the form of a Minnesota-type prior. For the
uncertainty series, I impose the prior belief of white noise; for the other variables, that of a
random walk.17 Figure 6 presents the results. In the United States, an increase in uncertainty
raises the volume of both corporate bonds and bank loans.18 On impact, bonds increase by
about 0.05 standard deviations, while loans rise by 0.3 standard deviations. These increases
are short-lived; the volumes are back in equilibrium after two quarters. In Germany, bank
loans increase by 0.2 standard deviations on impact, followed by a quick return to equilibrium
and a prolonged undershoot after two quarters. In contrast, corporate bonds do not react
significantly to a sudden change in uncertainty. In sum, these findings show that the reduction
in bank loan rates cannot be explained by a reduction in loan volumes at the aggregate level.
If anything, the amount of loans increases as uncertainty rises, indicating that most of the
banks attempt to alleviate the negative effects of uncertainty on firms in the short term.
16The monthly government bond yield and the uncertainty proxy is averaged to a quarterly frequency. As
loan rate, I use the original, not interpolated, loan rate series.
17Technically, the hyperparameter δunc for uncertainty is set to 0, the hyperparameters for the other
variables are equal to 1. The hyperparameter λ is calibrated to 0.25, which is in line with Banbura, Giannone,
and Reichlin (2010), who set λ to 0.262 in a VAR with seven variables. The impulse responses are computed
by generating 5,000 draws from the posterior.
18This model also allows discovering whether the interpolation of the U.S. loan rate from a quarterly to a
monthly frequency biases the results. The lending rate drops by 0.1 percentage points on impact and remains
significantly below the equilibrium rate for roughly a year, which is similar to the finding from the monthly
model.
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In the final robustness check, I extend the baseline model to include two additional
variables–real activity and a policy rate measure. For activity I take the log of production and
order it first in the system. Activity reacts to changes in uncertainty with a lag. As policy
rate I use the effective federal funds rate for the United States; for Germany it is the Euro
Overnight Index Average (EONIA). The policy rate is ordered last, reflecting the idea that
uncertainty has an immediate effect on short-term interest rates. Due to the relative large
number of variables, the models include additional information in the form of a Minnesota-type
prior as in the previous robustness check. For the uncertainty series, I impose the prior
belief of white noise; for the other variables, that of a random walk. The impulse responses
are depicted in Figure 7. In both countries, production falls as uncertainty suddenly rises,
and monetary policy becomes more expansionary. The reduction in policy rates is stronger
compared to the decrease in government bond yields. The baseline results are confirmed:
the costs of bond finance increase, while those of bank finance fall. For the United States,
the maximum changes are roughly halfed compared to the baseline. In Germany, bank loan
rates become less persistent; however, the magnitude of the decrease is similar to that of the
baseline. In contrast, corporate bond yields increase by a larger amount and the response is
also more persistent.
4 Partial Equilibrium Model of Lending Behavior
The empirical part of this paper shows that uncertainty is accompanied by increases in the cost
of bond finance and a reduction in the cost of bank loans. To explain these opposite reactions,
this section presents a partial equilibrium model that looks separately at the behavior of the
debt market and the banking sector in times of heightened uncertainty.
The model consists of two periods, t=1,2, and two types of lenders–the capital market
and a bank–from which firms borrow. All agents are risk (and ambiguity) neutral. Firms
do not have own resources for their projects and therefore borrow from a lender. Firms do
not individually decide on what type of financing they will pursue (see, e.g., Holmstrom
and Tirole, 1997); instead, one set of firms borrows from the capital market, and another set
receives loans from banks.19 Apart from this, there is no ex-ante heterogeneity among firms.
Investment projects are started at the beginning of the period and terminate at the end of
the same period. The investment yields a stochastic payoff xt ∈ [¯x, x¯], which is uniformly
distributed. Following Diamond (1984) and Gale and Hellwig (1985), there is an asymmetric
19This is in line with empirical evidence indicating that only a relative small fraction of firms has the
ability to switch from bank to bond finance, both in the United States and in Germany (see, e.g., Hainz and
Wiegand, 2013; Himmelberg and Morgan, 1995).
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information problem between borrowers and lenders. The distribution from which the payoffs
are drawn is known to all agents. The actual draw is the firm’s private information; the lender
can observe the payoff shock xt only by taking over the project. Monitoring and liquidating
the project involves costs µ¯.
There are two sources of uncertainty in the model–risk and ambiguity (Knightian un-
certainty). Risk σ raises the dispersion of the baseline distribution from which the payoff
shocks are drawn, x ∈ [
¯
x−σ, x¯+σ]. However, changes in risk cannot be perfectly observed by
borrowers and lenders as it is accompanied by ambiguity, denoted by parameter a. Firms
and lenders become less certain about what the exact distribution of firm returns may be.
They have a set of beliefs about the dispersion of this new distribution. In the spirit of Ilut
and Schneider (2014), the set of beliefs is parametrized by the interval of dispersions centered
around the true dispersion σ:
σa ∈ [σ (1−a) , σ (1 +a)] . (1)
Without acquiring extra information, agents observe the set of dispersions, σa, instead of the
true size of risk σ.20 The worst-case dispersion from this belief set is the highest dispersion
because, given the lending rate, it implies a higher expected probability of borrower default
compared to what the lowest value implies. Both higher risk and higher ambiguity imply a
more dispersed set of beliefs and a higher worst-case dispersion. Agents, who have ambiguous
belief sets, choose the worst-case dispersion when evaluating their profits:
σ∗a = max [σ(1−a), σ(1 +a)] . (2)
They do so because maximizing the lender’s profit with respect to the highest possible
dispersion results in lower (ex-post) absolute forecast errors compared to the lowest possible
dispersion.21 Therefore, unlike Ilut and Schneider (2014), the agents do not need to be
ambiguity averse.
Risk and ambiguity materialize at the beginning of t=1 and dissolve at the end of the
first period once the lender is repaid or default occurs. Therefore, the first period denotes
the short-run period during which uncertainty is elevated. The second period represents the
20The concept of ambiguity as used in this paper deviates from that of Ilut and Schneider (2014). In this
paper, ambiguity is about the dispersion instead of the mean. Therefore, risk and ambiguity are linked to
each other. If risk is positive, σ>0, there is ambiguity about the true size of risk. If risk is zero, σ=0, there
is no ambiguity. In the latter case, agents can assign correct probabilities to all outcomes, and they maximize
with respect to the distribution x ∈ [
¯
x, x¯]. In addition, and as shown later, this formulation of ambiguity does
not require that the agents are ambiguity averse.
21The proof for this result is presented in Appendix D.
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long-run equilibrium in which uncertainty is assumed to be zero, σ∗a = 0. However, payoffs are
still stochastic, xt ∈ [¯x, x¯], in Period 2.
4.1 Capital Market
At the beginning of the first and second periods, one set of firms borrows from the capital
market. If the borrower does not default at the end of t= 1, the capital market receives
repayment of the debt, and the contract ends. A firm that defaults is replaced by a new firm,
so that a new contract between borrower and lender can take place in Period 2. The capital
market relies on publicly available information about the borrower and does not invest in
acquiring additional information. Therefore, the structure of the one-period contract does not
change from the first to the second period. The one-period problem follows the outline of
Williamson (1987) and Walsh (2003).
A firm that borrows from the capital market is able to pay back its debt whenever its
revenue, xt, is larger than its debt, RCt ·Lt, where RCt is the cost of bond finance and Lt is
the volume of direct credit. Each project requires an investment of one unit; therefore, Lt=1
holds for both periods. If the firm announces a revenue xt≥ xˆt, it repays the loan. xˆt is the
threshold level at which the firm earns just enough from the project to pay back its debt RCt ,
which implies that xˆt=RCt . After paying back its debt, the firm keeps the residual (xt−RCt ).
The firm defaults if xt<xˆt; the bond investor monitors the firm, µ¯ is lost in the bankruptcy
procedure, and the lender receives (xt− µ¯). Defaulting firms receive nothing. Taking into
account that risk σ and ambiguity a rise at the beginning of the first period, a firm borrows




(x−RC1 ) dF (x)
}
≥ 0 . (3)
The structure of the expected return to firms in the second period is similar, except that σ=0
and RC1 is replaced by RC2 .











The first term in Equation (4) is the return to the lender if the borrower defaults, which
occurs whenever the project payoff x1 is smaller than RC1 . The second term is the return to
the lender if the borrower does not default, which holds whenever x1≥RC1 .
Following Afanasyeva and Güntner (2014), the debt contract is formulated from the
lender’s perspective, which ensures that the bond investors take an active part in determining
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the cost of market debt. The lender maximizes its expected return (Equation (4)) with respect
to the cost of bond finance, RC1 , subject to the borrower’s participation constraint (Equation
(3)). The first-order condition is:22
RC1 = x¯− µ¯+σ∗a .
An increase in uncertainty σ∗a raises the cost of market debt RC1 . Bond investors demand
to be compensated for the increased probability of borrower default. This constitutes the
risk compensation channel and is a standard result of a model with CSV. An increase in
monitoring costs µ¯ lowers the cost of market finance. Firms do not have resources of their
own; in case of default, they do not lose their net worth, and the lenders bear the costs. A
higher µ¯ makes borrower default more costly for the lender. The lender decreases RC1 in order
to reduce the likelihood of default.
Turning to Period 2, risk σ disappears and lenders only need to be compensated for the
normal risk stemming from the stochastic payoff x2 ∈ [¯x, x¯]. Bond financing becomes less
costly compared to Period 1:
RC2 = x¯− µ¯ . (5)
4.2 Banking Sector
One set of firms borrows from the bank at the beginning of the first and second periods. In
contrast to the capital market, the bank builds long-term relationships with its borrowers,
which provides the bank with two benefits. First, firms reveal proprietary information to the
bank at no cost during Period 1. This information is not publicly distributed because, if it
was, the firm’s competitors could profit from it (Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995). Sharing this
information lessens information asymmetries between the firm and the bank in the second
period: monitoring costs in Period 1, µ¯, decrease to (1− e) µ¯ in Period 2, given that firms
survive the first period. The parameter e is between 0 and 1 and governs how much narrower
the information asymmetries are between the borrower and the lender in Period 2 compared to
Period 1. The higher the parameter e, the greater the flow of private information from the firm
to the bank. Second, the bank may acquire additional costly market information in Period 1.
This information is not known to the firm. More information I about the market in which
the firm operates reduces the bank’s losses in the event the borrower defaults. Bankruptcy
22The complementary slackness condition implies that the borrower’s participation constraint (Equation
(3)) only binds for µ¯=0. Since this is a model of asymmetric information, µ¯>0 holds, and the Lagrange
parameter can be dropped. This argument holds for the second period also. The reason the constraint never
binds is that firms do not have any resources of their own. Therefore, they cannot lose any net worth when
they default. This means that firms never make negative profits. As there are always some situations in which
firms make positive profits, the firms’ expected profits have to be larger than zero.
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costs in the second period are lower by the amount c·I, where c is a parameter governing
how much a unit of information reduces the default costs. c can take values between 0 and
(1− e)µ¯, where the upper bound arises from the fact that the bankruptcy costs in the second
period cannot be smaller than zero. Information I is between [0,1]; a value of 0 implies no
additional market information, a value of 1 stands for full information.
Market information I comes along with an additional benefit. It reduces the uncertainty of
investment projects in the first period by lowering the ambiguous component a. The original
set of beliefs, described by expression (1), changes to:
σa(I) ∈ [σ (1−a [1− I]) , σ (1 +a [1− I])] .
The bank can reduce ambiguity to zero if it has full information, I=1, however, this does not
lower risk σ. The bank shares the information I with the borrower as part of the relationship.
All agents take the worst-case dispersion when they evaluate their plans, σ∗a(I) = max σa(I),
which is smaller than σ∗a from Equation (2), the worst-case dispersion that lenders and
borrowers on the capital market can experience.
In collecting market information, the bank has to pay two types of costs. First, to
investigate the market in which the borrower operates in more detail, the bank is required to
shift resources within the bank. By doing so, the bank incurs a fixed cost KI>0 irrespective
of the amount of acquired information. Second, rapidly increasing the amount of information
results in higher costs. The bank is faced with adjustment costs κ · 11−I ; the costs are
parametrized by κ.
The bank can reap the benefits from private information and some of the gains from
information about the business environment only in the second period, and only if the firm
does not default in the first period. Therefore, the bank takes into account that its actions in
Period 1 have an impact on its return in Period 2. If the borrower does not default in Period
1, the bank rolls over the loan to Period 2 and profits from the informational advantage. If the
borrower defaults in the first period, the bank can lend to a different firm in the second period
16
with the drawback of having no particular information about the new firm. The expected







[x1− µ¯] dF (x) +
∫ x¯+σ∗a(I)
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where RB1 and RB2 are the loan rates the relationship firm has to pay to the bank in Periods 1
and 2, respectively, µ¯B(I)=[(1− e)µ¯− c · I] are the costs of bankruptcy of relationship firms
in the second period, and R˜B2 is the loan rate paid by a no-relationship firm in Period 2. The
first line of Equation (6) describes the expected return in Period 1. The first term represents
the expected profit to the bank if the borrower defaults. The lender monitors and liquidates
the firm’s assets; the amount µ¯ is lost during this procedure. If the borrower does not default,
the lender receives the interest rate RB1 ; the expected return for this situation is denoted by
the second term. The costs associated with acquiring market information are described by
the third and fourth term.
The second line of Equation (6) accounts for the fact that the decision about the rate RB1
and information I not only affects the outcome in Period 1, but also in t=2. An increase in RB1
raises the probability that the borrower defaults in the first period, ceteris paribus, and reduces
the likelihood that the bank can continue the relationship with the borrower in Period 2. This
is represented by the first term in parentheses. The second term in parentheses describes the
expected return from continuing the relationship. The benefit from the relationship is a drop
in the cost of borrower default from µ¯ to µ¯B(I); the difference is due to the terms e·µ¯ and c·I.
The expression e·µ¯ reflects lower informational asymmetries between the borrower and the
lender. The expression c·I represents the idea that the lender can more easily continue the
project when the borrower defaults due to its additional information about the environment
in which the project is based.
If the firm defaults in the first period, the bank can still lend to a different firm in the
second period and charge the loan rate R˜B2 . However, in this case, the bank cannot profit from
lower informational asymmetries and the acquired information I is also useless in evaluating
the new firm’s project. This is denoted by the third line in Equation (6).
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A firm that forms a relationship with the bank only borrows from the bank if its expected




















)≥ 0 . (7)
The first term in Equation (7) is the firm’s expected profit in the first period. If a firm does
not default in t=1, denoted by the expression in the first set of parentheses, it borrows again
from the bank to finance a second investment from which it expects a profit, described by the
second set of parentheses.
The bank’s problem is to choose the lending rates RB1 , RB2 , and R˜B2 and the amount of
information I to maximize Equation (6) subject to the borrower’s participation constraints,
denoted by Equation (7) and Equation (3) with R˜B2 =RC1 and σ∗a = 0. Analytical results can
only be calculated for the three loan rates, the optimal amount of information I needs to be
simulated. RB1 , RB2 , and R˜B2 are23
R˜B2 = x¯− µ¯ (8)
RB2 = x¯− µ¯B(I) (9)

















If the borrower defaults in t=1, the bank can lend to a different firm in the second period
and demand the loan rate R˜B2 (Equation (8)). This rate equals the cost of bond finance in
Period 2 (Equation (5)) because the bank has no private information about this new firm nor
any information about the business environment in which it operates.
Equation (9) denotes the loan rate paid in Period 2 if the borrower does not default in
either period. Compared to the cost of bond finance in Period 2 (Equation (5)) or the loan
rate the bank charges a no-relationship-firm (Equation (8)), the bank lending rate is larger by
the amount e·µ¯+ c·I. This represents the markup the bank can charge when it establishes
a relationship with the borrower. The loan markup can increase for three reasons. First,
the bank receives more proprietary information from the firm (an increase in e). Second,
the bank acquires additional information about the firm’s business environment (a higher
I). Third, the bank may learn more from a marginal unit of this information (a rise in c).
All three factors enable the lender to charger higher loan rates because the default situation
is less feared by the lender since it is now less costly. These costs are borne by the lender
23The complementary slackness condition implies that the first participation constraint (Equation (7))
does not bind when µ¯= µ¯B(I)=0. The second constraint (Equation (3)) only binds for µ¯=0. Therefore, the
Lagrange parameters can be omitted in the subsequent analysis. The reason the constraints do not bind is
explained in footnote 22.
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because firms do not lose their net worth when they default. Therefore, the costs of bank
finance are higher compared to bond finance in the second period, which denotes the long
run. This is consistent with the data. On average, bank loan rates are higher than corporate
bond yields.24 In this way, banks can accommodate their borrowers in economically bad times
(described by the first period) with more favorable loan conditions in an effort to maintain
their customer relationships.
Equation (10) is the bank loan rate in Period 1. There are two channels through which
the loan rate may change as uncertainty increases, and they work in opposite directions. First,





= 1 +a(1− I¯)> 0 .
Risk increases the probability of borrower default, and the bank demands compensation in
form of a higher loan rate. This is the risk compensation channel. Second, banks may acquire
more information I in times of elevated uncertainty, which puts downward pressure on the














c < 0 .
Acquiring additional market information may make the loan rate fall for two reasons. First,
it reduces ambiguity. The set of beliefs that the agents hold becomes less dispersed, which
lowers the worst-case dispersion. This reduces the probability of borrower default, thereby
decreasing the lending rate. Second, having collected more information in the first period,
bankruptcy costs are lower in Period 2, making it more attractive for the bank to continue
the relationship with the borrower in the second period. By reducing the lending rate in t=1,
borrower default in Period 1 becomes less likely and the bank profits from lower bankruptcy
costs in Period 2. These two effects constitute the information channel. The next section
analyzes whether the information channel can dominate the risk compensation channel.
4.3 Simulation of the Banking Sector
The risk compensation channel increases the loan rate as uncertainty rises. The information
channel decreases the lending rate when uncertainty is elevated. If the latter channel dominates
the former, the loan rate may fall in times of heightened uncertainty. To discover under what
24For example, for the United States the rate on loans with a maturity of one year is 3.75% for the time
period 2003:Q1 to 2016:Q2, while the yield on corporate bonds with a maturity of one to three years is 3.15%.
19
conditions banks endogenously acquire more information I when uncertainty increases and
whether the lending rate falls, I conduct the following simulations of the model.
4.3.1 Baseline Simulation
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values. The interval bounds x¯ and
¯
x, the monitoring costs
µ¯, and the markup parameter e are chosen to obtain reasonable values for the default rate,
and the loan rates RB2 and R˜B2 when there is no risk, σ = 0, and no acquisition of market
information, I = 0, for the United States. The ambiguity parameter a is set so that an increase
in risk σ raises total uncertainty σ∗a(I=0) twice as much.25 This reflects the finding of Rossi
et al. (2016) that both ambiguity and risk are important components of total uncertainty.
Figure 8 presents the evolution of bank profits (left panel), calculated from Equation
(6), and the loan rate in the first period (right panel), computed from Equation (10), as the
amount of information increases. In the simulation, two levels of risk are compared: no risk,
σ=0 (depicted by the solid lines), and elevated risk, σ>0 (dashed lines). Starting from a
situation with no risk and no additional information about the business environment, the
expected bank profit drops as the bank starts to collect some information. This is due to
incurring the fixed costs of acquiring the information. As more and more information is
accumulated, the expected profit increases as the higher information level reduces the cost
of a borrower default in Period 2. However, profits do not monotonically rise because of
the adjustment costs associated with changes in the level of information. If these costs are
substantial, the gains from information do not exceed those that would have been made
without any additional information; the maximum possible profit is shown by the horizontal
dashed dotted line in the left panel. Therefore, the bank chooses to acquire no additional
information when risk is zero. The corresponding loan rate is represented in the right panel
by the point in the left-most position on the solid line.
Now, the bank observes an increase in risk. Having no additional information, the bank’s
profit drops substantially. Collecting the first bits of market information results in a further
drop in profit due to the fixed costs. Gathering more and more information increases the
profit and it becomes larger than the profit made in the absence of additional information.
This is because market information not only lowers bankruptcy costs in Period 2, it also
25I set x¯= 10,
¯
x= 2.9, and µ¯= 6.85 in order to match an annualized default rate of 3.5% and a corporate
bond yield of 3.15% (because R˜B2 = RC2 ). e = 0.085 delivers a bank loan rate of 3.73%, which implies a
markup on the bank loan rate of 58 basis points compared to the corporate bond yield, given I = 0 (because
RB2 − R˜B2 = eµ¯ if I = 0). Ambiguity a equals 1. I calibrate c to 2.0 so that a marginal increase of market
information by 0.1 increases the markup on the loan rate by 20 basis points. The fixed costs are set to 0.3,
the adjustment costs to 0.025. Risk σ is set to 0. In the scenario with elevated risk, σ is calibrated to 0.2,
matching the rise in the lending rate when uncertainty increases, given that there are no relationship lending






reduces ambiguity in Period 1. The set of beliefs about the distribution of project returns
becomes less dispersed, resulting in a lower worst-case dispersion. The optimal amount of
information has an interior solution because, from a certain amount of information onward,
the cost of an additional marginal unit of information outweighs the benefit. The horizontal
dotted line in the left panel indicates the maximum possible profit, the vertical dotted line
marks the optimal amount of information. The right panel shows that this level of information
is associated with a loan rate that is below the rate when there is no risk. Therefore, when
risk is elevated, the bank reduces the lending rate due to less ambiguity and lower bankruptcy
costs, which are induced by acquiring a positive amount of market information.
4.3.2 Sensitivity Analyses
The baseline simulation shows that the bank lending rate is lower in periods of elevated risk
compared to times of no risk. To complete the simulation exercise, I look at the parameters
potentially driving this result. The values for the following three parameters are changed one
at a time: the ambiguous component a, the markup e that denotes the size of acquired private
information, and the markup c that is the result of having collected additional information
about the firm’s business environment. The bottom part of Table 1 summarizes the values.
In Figures 9 and 10, the black lines show the case of no risk, the red lines show elevated risk.
The thick dotted lines are the results from the baseline simulation, the dashed dotted lines
present the results when the respective parameter is larger than in the baseline, the dashed
lines when the parameter is smaller, and the solid lines when the parameter is set to zero.
The two panels at the top of Figure 9 show that a higher level of ambiguity a than in the
baseline increases the amount of information that is optimal. The lending rate in Period 1 is
still lower than when there is no risk. If ambiguity is positive, but less than in the baseline,
the amount of information is still positive but smaller than in the baseline, while the lending
rate in Period 1 is still lower than the rate when there is no risk. If there is no ambiguity,
a=0, there are no gains in the first period from acquiring information; information only helps
to increase monopoly power in the second period. However, this is not enough for the bank to
lower the lending rate. Therefore, the loan rate is higher compared to the situation of no risk.
An increase in the flow of proprietary information to the bank, which corresponds to
an increase in the parameter e, strengthens the bank’s information monopoly in Period 2.
This opens the possibility for the bank to demand higher loan rates in the second period,
which increases the expected profit (see the two bottom panels in Figure 9). However, in
order to take advantage of the higher monopoly power, the bank needs to ensure that the
borrower does not default during the first period. Therefore, the bank charges a lower rate in
Period 1 compared to the baseline simulation. In contrast, if there is a weaker flow of private
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information or no flow at all, e= 0, maintaining the relationship with the borrower loses its
appeal. The lending rate is higher compared to the situation of no risk, and the bank does
not collect any market information, I = 0.
An increase in parameter c describes a situation in which a marginal unit of market
information reduces bankruptcy costs in the second period by a greater amount. In this
case, it is optimal for the bank to increase its market information (see Figure 10). The bank
charges a lower lending rate in the first period than in the baseline, in the hope of keeping
the borrower from defaulting and maintaining the relationship up to the second period. In
contrast, if information decreases default costs by only a small amount or not at all, c= 0,
the bank does not acquire any information I, and the loan rate is above the rate charged in
times of no risk. If there is no risk and c is higher than in the baseline, the bank collects a
positive amount of information. However, this yields a lending rate that deviates relatively
strongly from the average lending rate observed in the data. Overall, the model is relatively
sensitive to the choice of the parameter c, which is not surprising given the two-period-nature
of the model and given that c is the central parameter governing the importance of the second
period, which is a proxy for all future periods.
In sum, banks need to be able to acquire both private and market information, so as to
reduce ambiguity in Period 1 and lower bankruptcy costs in Period 2. Then they can offer
lower lending rates during periods of elevated risk.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that the costs of bond and bank finance react differently from each other in
times of elevated uncertainty. Bond yields rise; loan rates fall. This difference arises because
banks act to reduce informational problems, whether they are asymmetric or general in nature.
In uncertain times, costly information becomes more valuable as it reduces uncertainty, thereby
decreasing the likelihood of borrower default. In addition, relationships with borrowers become
more important for the lenders because acquiring more information today increases the bank’s
information monopoly in the future, which implies higher long-term profits. Both effects lead
banks to lower interest rates during periods of heightened uncertainty. In this way, banks
may lessen the negative effects of uncertainty on firms in the short-term. In the long run,
banks charge higher rates on average compared to the capital market so as to accommodate,
at least to some extent, borrowers during economically difficult times.
However, lower interest rates in periods of uncertainty reduce banks’ short-term profits.
Lower profits imply that not all banks are able to cut interest rates in uncertain times. On
the one hand, banks that are better capitalized may continue to lend to firms in periods of
22
heightened uncertainty at lower rates so as to maintain their relationships with borrowers.
On the other hand, weakly capitalized banks reduce their lending and cannot attempt to
mitigate the adverse consequences of uncertainty for their clients. Therefore, strong capital




Figure 1: Debt Financing of Nonfinancial Corporations in 2015



















Notes: Data for Spain, Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom are from the financial balance sheets
of Eurostat’s quarterly sector accounts. For the United States, the data are from the financial accounts
statistic of the Federal Reserve Board. Loans and corporate bonds as shares of total debt are calculated for
2015.
Figure 2: Uncertainty and the Costs of Bank and Bond Finance
Uncertainty and Corporate Bond Yields
















































Uncertainty and Bank Loan Rates


























































Notes: The figure shows the quarterly averages of the monthly time series, except for the U.S. loan rate, which
is originally at a quarterly frequency. The uncertainty proxy for the United States, FDISPUS , is from the
BOS; that for Germany, FDISPGER, from the IFO-BCS. Both uncertainty proxies are standardized. The
sample period is 2003:Q1–2016:Q2.
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to Uncertainty Shock for the United States and Germany
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Notes: Effects of a unit shock to the standardized uncertainty series FDISPUS and FDISPGER, respectively.
Uncertainty is expressed in unit values, while all other variables are expressed in basis points. Monthly VARs
are estimated with three variables. Uncertainty is ordered first in a recursive identification. The responses
in rows 1 and 2 are estimated with corporate bond yields, those in rows 3 and 4 with bank loan rates. The
impulse responses of the spread variables are calculated as the difference between each of the responses of
the cost of external finance and the riskless rate. The sample period is from 2003:M1–2016:M6. The black
solid line depicts the point estimate, the shaded areas represent the 95% confidence intervals based on 5,000
bootstrap replications.
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Figure 4: Robustness I: Impulse Responses to Uncertainty Shock with Three Variables for
the United States: Loan Rates Conditional on Risk Type
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Notes: Effects of a unit shock to the standardized uncertainty series FDISPUS . Uncertainty is expressed in
unit values, while all other variables are expressed in basis points. Monthly VARs are estimated with three
variables. Uncertainty is ordered first in a recursive identification. The responses in row 1 are estimated with
loan rates for borrowers with minimal risk, in row 2 with low risk, in row 3 with moderate risk, and row 4
with acceptable risk. The sample period is from 2003:M1–2016:M6. The black solid line depicts the point
estimate, the shaded areas represent the 95% confidence intervals based on 5,000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 5: Robustness II: Impulse Responses to Uncertainty Shock
(a) GER: Loan Rates Conditional on Loan Size
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Notes: Effects of a unit shock to the standardized uncertainty series FDISPGER or FDISPUS . Uncertainty
is expressed in unit values, while all other variables are expressed in basis points. Uncertainty is ordered first
in a recursive identification. The responses in row 1 are estimated with bank loan rates on loans in an amount
up to 1 Mio Euro and in row 2 with bank loan rates on loans in an amount over 1 Mio Euro; both rows are
for Germany. Rows 3 and 4 are estimated with both the bank loan rate and the corporate bond yield in one
model for the United States and Germany, respectively. The latter model includes two government bond
yields of different maturity. The sample period is from 2003:M1–2016:M6. The black solid line depicts the
point estimate, the shaded areas represent the 95% confidence intervals based on 5,000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 6: Robustness III: Impulse Responses to Uncertainty Shock with Costs and Volumes
of External Financing for the United States and Germany from a Bayesian VAR
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Notes: Effects of a unit shock to the standardized uncertainty series FDISPUS and FDISPGER, respectively.
Uncertainty is expressed in unit values, loan and bond volumes are expressed in standard deviations, while all
other variables are expressed in basis points. Uncertainty is ordered first in a recursive identification. The
model for the Unites States is at a quarterly frequency with a sample period from 2003:Q1–2016:Q2, that for
Germany is at a monthly frequency with a sample period from 2003:M1–2016:M6. Both models are estimated
with Bayesian techniques. The black solid lines depict the median responses, the shaded areas represent 68%
error bands.
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Figure 7: Robustness IV: Impulse Responses to Uncertainty Shock with Five Variables for
the United States and Germany from a Bayesian VAR
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Notes: Effects of a unit shock to the standardized uncertainty series FDISPUS and FDISPGER, respectively.
Uncertainty is expressed in unit values, production is expressed in percent, while all other variables are
expressed in basis points. Monthly Bayesian VARs are estimated with five variables. Uncertainty is ordered
second after the activity variable in a recursive identification. The responses in rows 1 and 2 are estimated with
corporate bond yields, those in rows 3 and 4 with bank loan rates. The sample period is from 2003:M1–2016:M6.
The black solid lines depict the median responses, the shaded areas represent 68% error bands.
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Figure 8: Baseline Results




































Notes: The left panel depicts the evolution of profits as market information increases, the right panel shows
the reaction of loan rates as market information increases. The solid line is computed with no risk, σ = 0, the
dashed line with elevated risk, σ > 0. In the left panel, the maximum possible profits are indicated by the
horizontal dashed dotted line when σ = 0 and by the horizontal dotted line when σ > 0. The vertical dotted
lines in both panels denote the optimal amount of information when σ > 0. In the right panel, the horizontal
dotted line indicates the optimal lending rate when σ > 0.
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Figure 9: Robustness (1)
Ambiguity a
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Notes: The left panels depict the evolution of profits as market information increases, the right panels show the
reaction of loan rates as market information increases. The black lines are computed with no risk, σ = 0, the
red lines with elevated risk, σ > 0. The dotted lines represent the results with the baseline parametrization.
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Figure 10: Robustness (2)
Markup Due to Market Information c









































Notes: The left panel depicts the evolution of profits as market information increases, the right panel shows the
reaction of loan rates as market information increases. The black lines are computed with no risk, σ = 0, the
red lines with elevated risk, σ > 0. The dotted lines represent the results with the baseline parametrization.
Table
Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
x¯ 10 Upper Bound of Interval
¯
x 2.9 Lower Bound of Interval
µ¯ 6.85 Monitoring Cost
e 0.085 Markup Due to Private Information Acquisition
a 1 Ambiguity
σ 0 or 0.2 Risk
c 2 Markup Due to Market Information
KI>0 0.3 Fixed Cost of Information Acquisition
κ 0.025 Adjustment Cost of Information Acquisition
Values for Sensitivity Analyses
a 0 / 0.7 / 1.0 / 1.5 Ambiguity
e 0 / 0.05 / 0.085 / 0.1 Markup Due to Private Information
c 0 / 1.5 / 2.0 / 2.5 Markup Due to Market Information
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Appendix
A Construction of Idiosyncratic Uncertainty Proxies
For Germany, I use manufacturing firms’ responses to the monthly IFO Business Climate
Survey (IFO-BSC). The Business Climate Index, which is based on this survey, is a much-
followed leading indicator for economic activity in Germany. I focus on the following question
from the survey:
Expectations for the next three months: Our domestic production activities
with respect to product X will (without taking into account differences in the length
of months or seasonal fluctuations) increase, roughly stay the same, decrease.
Exp+t is defined as the fraction of firms that expect at time t an increase in production
activity and Exp−t as the fraction of firms that expect a decrease. Uncertainty is proxied by
the cross-sectional dispersion of expectations about future production:
FDISPGERt =
√
Exp+t +Exp−t − (Exp+t −Exp−t )2 , (11)
For the United States, I use data from the Business Outlook Survey (BOS), which is
conducted on a monthly basis by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and surveys large
manufacturing firms in the Third Fed district.26 I focus on the following question from the
survey:
General Business Conditions: What is your evaluation of the level of general
business activity six months from now vs. [Current Month]: decrease, no change,
increase?
In contrast to what is available for the IFO-BSC, I do not have access to detailed micro
data from the BOS. However, the net balances Exp+t and Exp−t are available. Using Equation
(11), I calculate the U.S. uncertainty proxy, FDISPUS , as the dispersion of firms’ forecasts
about the general business outlook.
26Bachmann et al. (2013) argue that the BOS is representative of the entire United States. They find




Table 2: Data Sources: Germany
Variable Description Source
FDISPGER Cross-sectional standard deviation of production
expectations, manufacturing firms, seasonally adjusted
with X-12 and standardized
IFO & own
calculations
Production Manufacturing sector, seasonally adjusted, constant prices Federal Statistical
Office
Corp bond yield Yields on fully taxed bonds outstanding, issued by
non-financial corporations, average maturity of 6 years
Bundesbank
Corp bond volume Securities other than shares, excluding financial
derivatives, net issues (flows), non-financial corporations,
12-month cumulative values and standardized
ECB Statistical
Data Warehouse
Loan rate Loan rate for loans other than revolving loans and
overdrafts, non-financial corporations, newly issued, up
to 1 year, in % p.a.
Bundesbank
Loan rate < 1 Mio Loan rate for loans other than revolving loans and
overdrafts, non-financial corporations, newly issued, up
to 1 year, up to 1 Mio, in % p.a.
Bundesbank
Loan rate > 1 Mio Loan rate for loans other than revolving loans and
overdrafts, non-financial corporations, newly issued, up
to 1 year, over 1 Mio, in % p.a.
Bundesbank
Loan volume Loans other than revolving loans and overdrafts,





1 to 2 years of maturity, in % p.a. Bundesbank
Government
bond yield 6y
5 to 6 years of maturity, in % p.a. Bundesbank




Table 3: Data Sources: United States
Variable Description Source
FDISPUS Cross-sectional standard deviation of business
expectations, manufacturing firms, third FED district,
seasonally adjusted with X-12 and standardized
BOS & own
calculations






Effective yield of investment-grade-rated corporate debt




Effective yield of Baa-rated corporate debt with maturity
of 30 years
Moody’s
Corp bond volume Corporate bonds, flows from financial accounts,




Loan rate 1y Charged by commercial banks for all new commercial
and industrial loans, up to 1 year, interpolated from
quarterly to monthly frequency*, shifted**, in % p.a.
Federal Reserve
Board
Loan rate 1y/min Charged by commercial banks for all new commercial
and industrial loans, up to 1 year, with minimal risk,
interpolated from quarterly to monthly frequency*,
shifted**, in % p.a.
Federal Reserve
Board
Loan rate 1y/low Charged by commercial banks for all new commercial
and industrial loans, up to 1 year, with low risk,
interpolated from quarterly to monthly frequency*,
shifted**, in % p.a.
Federal Reserve
Board
Loan rate 1y/mod Charged by commercial banks for all new commercial
and industrial loans, up to 1 year, with moderate risk,
interpolated from quarterly to monthly frequency*,
shifted**, in % p.a.
Federal Reserve
Board
Loan rate 1y/acc Charged by commercial banks for all new commercial
and industrial loans, up to 1 year, with other risk
(acceptable), interpolated from quarterly to monthly
frequency*, shifted**, in % p.a.
Federal Reserve
Board




Prime rate Charged by commercial banks, used to price short-term





30-year treasury bond yield, in months where the 30-year
treasury bond was missing the 20-year treasury bond was













Fed Funds Effective Rate, in % p.a. Federal Reserve
Board
Notes: *: The series is interpolated with the Chow-Lin procedure using the prime rate as the monthly
interpolator variable. **: The interpolated monthly series is shifted by one month, because the original
quarterly data are collected during the middle month of each quarter.
C Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Risk
This section analyzes whether a lower lending rate during periods of elevated risk could be
due to problems of adverse selection or moral hazard. Banks may be reluctant to raise interest
rates when risk increases because this may shift the composition of their loan portfolio towards
borrowers with riskier projects (adverse selection) or because they fear that borrowers will
switch to riskier projects (moral hazard).
C.1 Adverse Selection
This section shows that the presence of adverse selection implies higher lending rates when risk
increases. The structure of the model is based on the Walsh (2003) version of the Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) model. Firms invest in projects that yield a return of R+xσ with probability 12
and R−xσ with probability 12 . xσ equals x+σ, where x denotes the normal riskiness of the
project and σ is additional risk; the latter can be thought of as a risk shock that is observable
by all agents. Projects are fully financed by bank loans L, on which the interest rate RB is
paid. Each project requires an investment of one unit; therefore, L= 1. If the project yields
the high return, R+xσ, the loan is repaid and the firm receives R+xσ−RB. If the project
yields the low return, R−xσ, the borrower defaults and receives nothing; the bank receives






from which the threshold level xˆσ can be derived at which EpiFirm equals zero,
xˆσ =RB−R .
The threshold increases in RB. There are two types of borrowers, one with low-risk projects,
xσ = xσl , and one with higher-risk investments, xσ = xσh > xσl . Both types are equally likely.
If the loan rate is small enough so that xˆσ ≤ xσl < xσh, both groups of firms borrow from the








The bank return increases with RB as long as the threshold level xˆσ is smaller than xσl .
However, if the bank raises RB by enough that the threshold level is above xσl , all low-risk









The bank profit falls when the lending rate is
RBσ = xσl +R , (12)
because of the shift in the composition of the bank’s loan portfolio toward borrowers with
high-risk projects. Evaluating Equation (12) at xσ=0l (when there is no additional risk) and,




If the lender cannot observe the borrower’s risk type, it is optimal to increase the lending
rate when there is additional risk because higher risk implies that borrowers gain on the
upside, while having limited liability on the downside. Both xσl and xσh increase. A higher xσl
implies that the threshold value xˆσ can also increase without a drop out of all borrowers with
relatively low risk projects. A higher xˆσ is associated with a higher lending rate.
C.2 Moral Hazard
This section shows that moral hazard implies higher loan rates when risk rises. The structure
of the model is based on the Walsh (2003) version of the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model. A
firm can either invest in project l, which yields a return of R+xσl with probability pl and
R−xσl with probability 1−pl or it invests in project h with a yield of R+xσh with probability
ph and R−xσh with probability 1−ph. xσi equals xi+σ, where i= (l,h) is the type of project
risk, x denotes the normal riskiness of the project, and σ is additional risk; the latter can be
thought of as a risk shock that is observable by all agents. Project h is riskier than l with
xσh > x
σ
l and pl > ph. Projects are fully financed by bank loans L, on which the interest rate
RB is paid. Each project requires an investment of one unit; therefore, L= 1. If either of the
two projects yields a high return, R+xσi , the loan is repaid and the firm receives R+xσi −RB.
If project i yields a low return, R−xσi , the borrower defaults and receives nothing; the bank
receives the project return. Investing in project l, the firm can expect a profit of
EpiFirml = pl [R+xσl −RB] ,
while the expected return from project h is
EpiFirmh = ph [R+xσh−RB] .
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If the expected profits of the two projects are equal, EpiFirml = EpiFirmh , the threshold value





If the loan rate is below RˆB, the firm prefers the project with lower risk l, and the expected
return to the bank is
EpiBankl = pl ·RB + (1−pl)(R−xσl ) .
If, instead, RB > RˆB, the firm invests in the riskier project h. The bank’s expected profit
drops to
EpiBankh = ph ·RB + (1−ph)(R−xσh) ,
because EpiBankl (RˆB)>EpiBankh (RˆB).27 Therefore, the bank has an incentive not to raise the
loan rate above RˆB given a level of risk σ. Evaluating Equation (13) at xσ=0l (when there is




because pl > ph. If the bank cannot observe which of the projects the borrower chooses, it is
still optimal to raise the loan rate when risk increases because all projects become riskier,
and the borrower switches to the riskier project h only at a higher lending rate.
27This is because xσh(1−2ph)−xσl (1−2pl)> 0.
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D Ex-Post Forecast Errors and Ambiguity
This section shows that the (ex-post) absolute forecast errors derived from the lowest possible
dispersion, σ(1−a), are higher than from the highest possible dispersion, σ(1 +a).
The forecast error, FE, equals pi−E[pi], where pi is the lender’s realized profit and E[pi] is
the expected profit. The realized profit depends on the true level of risk, σ, while the expected
profit depends on σa ∈ [σ (1−a) , σ (1 +a)]. To compute the forecast error for the highest
possible dispersion, FEh, I use σa,h = σ(1+a) and the associated loan rate, Rh = x¯− µ¯+σa,h,
which yields:
FEh = δ1− 1























































The forecast error for the lowest possible dispersion, FEl, depends on σa,l = σ(1−a) and the
associated loan rate, Rl = x¯− µ¯+σa,l, which yields:
FEl = δ1− 1













Taking the absolute values of the forecast errors, abs(FEl) = |FEl| and abs(FEh) = |FEh|,









x−2µ¯+σ)σ and γ1 =−α1−α2−α3− 12a
2σ2 .
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